A dynamic Walrasian economy is said to exhibit inconsistency if the competitive equilibrium path resulting from government reoptimization at some time rr0 is not a continuation of the competitive equilibrium path resulting from the initial government optimization at time 0. The present paper establishes necessary and sufficient conditions for consistency for a general class of dynamic Walrasian economies. It is seen, for example, that reliance on nondistortionary policy instruments is neither necessary nor sufftcient for consistency. It is also shown that Pareto optimal paths can be supported as optimal competitive equilibrium paths only if consistency prevails. However, consistent optimal competitive equilibrium paths need not be Pareto optimal.
Introduction
Consider a dynamic Walrasian economy comprising a consumer sector, a firm sector, and a government. At each time r 20 the government selects a path of policy variables for current and future times so that the corresponding competitive equilibrium path yields the highest feasible social welfare. Such a competitive equilibrium path is referred to as the optimal time-r competitive equilibrium path. The economy is said to exhibit inconsistency if, for some time r > 0, the optimal time-r competitive equilibrium path is not a continuation of the optimal time-0 competitive equilibrium path.
Inconsistency might seem an unsurprising phenomenon for economies subject to unforeseen disturbances, preference changes, miscalculated policy effects, or basic differences between social and private objectives. However, four recent studies [Calvo (1978, appendix 2) , Kydland and Prescott (1980) , Fischer (1980) , and Turnovsky and Brock (1980) ] have produced examples demonstrating that dynamic Walrasian economies can exhibit inconsistency *The present paper is a revised condensed version of a working paper [Tesfatsion (1984a) even when there is no exogenous uncertainty, preferences are unchanging, all agents have perfect foresight, and government is benevolent in the sense that it attempts to maximize the lifetime utility of the representative consumer through provision of a public good.
In addition, Fischer (1980) finds that consistency prevails in his framework if the government relies solely on nondistortionary taxes to finance the public good; and Turnovsky and Brock (1980) find that consistency prevails in their framework if the government relies on monetary instruments. However, because of the special nature of each framework, it is difficult to determine the generality of these findings.
The present paper establishes necessary and sufficient conditions for consistency for a general class of dynamic Walrasian benevolent government economies which includes the frameworks of the four studies cited above as special cases. Reliance on nondistortionary policy instruments is seen to be neither necessary nor sufficient for consistency in general;' and similarly for reliance on monetary instruments. The relationship between consistency and the two basic welfare theorems is also clarified.
The class of dynamic Walrasian economies treated in the present paper is described in section 2. Each economy is a Walrasian general equilibrium model with a single representative consumer and a single representative firm, extended statically to include a benevolent government sector, and dynamically to allow all agents to reoptimize at each point in time as real time proceeds. Each reoptimization is modelled as an open-loop Stackelberg game with the government as the leader and the consumer and firm as the followers.2 The consumer and firm have perfect foresight in the usual ArrowDebreu sense, i.e. at each time z they correctly anticipate the currently optimal paths for future prices and future government policies. However, they do not anticipate the possibility of future reoptimization.
General necessary and sufficient conditions for consistency are established in section 3. Briefly, it is sufficient for consistency that certain constraints ' Specific examples demonstrating that reliance on lump-sum taxation is neither necessary nor sufficient for consistency are provided in Hillier and Malcomson (1984) and in Tesfatsion (1984b) . Hillier and Malcomson (1984) focus on the extent to which government has essential control over prices. Both Tesfatsion (1984b) and the present paper focus on the extent to which private agents possess and make use of structural information. Reconciliation of these two viewpoints is an interesting open question. To avoid misunderstanding, it should be noted that the insufficiency examples in both Tesfatsion (1984b) and Hillier and Malcomson (1984) necessarily share the following characteristic: government is not able to achieve the first-best (command) optimum with the particular array of lump-sum taxes and subsidies at its disposal. As clarified in section 5, below, any first-best optimum which can be supported in the initial period as an optimal competitive equilibrium path will be consistently carried out. *As will be clarified in section 2, the successive Stackelberg games are 'open loop' in the following sense. At each successive current time c, the consumer and the firm make choices for current and future times tzr conditioned only on anticipated prices, anticipated government policy variables, and the current time-r state vector. appearing in the constraint set for government's initial time-0 optimization problem be redundant for that problem. It is necessary for consistency that these same time-0 constraints be redundant when appended to the constraint sets faced by government as it successively reoptimizes at later times z >O. The necessary condition for consistency implies, for example, that the plans for current and future times made by the consumer, the firm, and the government at time 0 must never be regretted, even after these plans have actually been implemented.
In section 4 it is shown that the general sufficient condition for consistency established in section 3 is satisfied in two special cases: either (a) the consumer and firm exhibit perfect myopic foresight, in the sense [Burmeister (1980) More precisely, the consumer's time-0 optimization problem is to select a choice path c8=(c"(t)),,, of choice vectors co(t) for current and future times t 20 to maximize his lifetime utility, my 7 ut(cO(t) 1 f"(kO(O, p"(t), x'(t)) dt, 0 subject to the feasibility conditions co(t) E C(f0(%s0(4, p"(t), x0(t)), t 20, (lb) and the state equations i0(t) = S,(cO(t), f"(~),g"(~), p"(t), x0(t)), t 2 0; (14 x0(O) =x0.
(14
In (l), u, measures the consumer's time-t utility as a real-valued function of his time-t choice vector co(t). The consumer's time-t utility is conditioned on the anticipated time-t firm choice vector f'(t), the anticipated time-t government policy vector go(t), the anticipated time-t price vector p'(t), and the anticipated time-t state vector ~'(t).~ The time-t feasible choice set for c'(t), conditioned on these same four anticipated vectors, is denoted by F;. Finally, S, denotes the known time-t state function.5 Typically the consumer's choice vectors co(t) incorporate demands for and supplies of goods, services, and financial assets, and the consumer's feasible choice sets P; consist of budget constraints and non-negativity restrictions. Dependence of 9; on the anticipated firm choice vector f'(t) occurs if, for example, the firm distributes profits to the consumer, thus affecting the consumer's budget constraints.
In complete symmetry to the consumer, the time-0 optimization problem for the firm is to select a choice path fE=(f"(t))tbo of choice vectors f'(t) at time t, e.g. capital stocks as in Fischer (1980) and Kydland and Prescott (1980) and/or money and bond holdings as in Turnovsky and Brock (1980) . As detailed in Tesfatsion (1984a, appendix), Calvo's model (1978) has no state variables in the sense used here.
4The vectors c'-'(t), f"(t), g'(t), p'(t), and x'(t) are assumed to be elements of Euclidean spaces 'Consumer optimization problems with a finite planning horizon T are handled in format (1) by specifying u, and S, to be trivial O-valued functions, and 9; to be the empty set, for all times t z 7: A similar observation holds for the firm and government optimization problems, described below.
for current and future times t 2 0 to maximize intertemporal profits, mf;x 3 fl,U"(t) 1 c" (O,go(O, p"(t) 
and the state equations i0(r) = S,(cO(t), f"(~),s"(t), PO(C), x0(t)), t 20;
(24
In (2), 17, is a real-valued function measuring the time-t profitability of f'(t) conditioned on the anticipated time-t consumer choice vector co(t), the anticipated time-t government policy vector g"(t), the anticipated time-t price vector p'(t), and the anticipated time-t state vector x'(t). The time-t feasible choice set for f'(t), conditioned on these same four anticipated vectors, is denoted by %F{. Finally, S, denotes the known time-t state function. Typically the firm's choice vectors f'(t) incorporate demands for and supplies of goods, services, and capital reserves, and the firm's feasible choice sets Y"_: are production possibility sets. The market equilibrium conditions at time 0 for current and future times t 2 0 are given by a system of vector equations of the form -
where P:(t) denotes the vector of right derivatives for p"(t). The presence of the time-t state vector x'(t) in (3) allows the consideration of stock as well as flow market clearing conditions, as in Kydland and Prescott (1980) . The presence of PO+(t) in (3) allows the imposition of rational expectations equilibrium conditions on the market clearing price path, e.g. the anticipated inflation rate equal to the actual inflation rate for all times t>=O as in Calvo (1978) and Turnovsky and Brock (1980) . Any triplet of sequences (cg, f~,p~)=(c"(t),fo(t),po(t)),,, which jointly solves the individual optimization problems (1) and (2) together with the market equilibrium conditions (3) is a competitive equilibrium as usually defined, except here the competitive equilibrium is conditioned on the government policy path gg =(g"(t))IZo and the exogenously given initial state vector x0. The government at time 0 is assumed to have complete knowledge of (l), (2), and (3), and to behave beneuolently in the following sense: government selects a feasible policy path gz so that the corresponding competitive equilibrium (cg, fz,pz) yields the highest possible lifetime utility for the consumer.6
Formally, the time-0 optimization problem for government is to select a policy path gz to maximize the consumer's lifetime utility,
(44 subject to the feasibility conditions
the state equations aott = UC"(t), fO(t),sO(t), pO(t), x0(t)), t 2 0; 
and the market equilibrium conditions 0 = J,(cO(t), fO(hrO(~), p"(t), do+(t), xO(N, t 20.
(4f)
In (4), 9; denotes the time-t feasible choice set for the time-t policy vector go(
t) conditioned on (c'(t), f'(t), p"(t), x'(t)), and S, denotes the known time-t state function. Typically go(t) comprises fiscal and monetary
policy instruments such as taxes, public good expenditures, and changes in money and bond supplies, and 9; includes a government budget constraint together with non-negativity restrictions on various components of g"(t). In principle, ignoring existence and uniqueness questions, the optimization problems (l), (2), and (4) can be jointly solved for (c~,f~,g~,p~) as functions of the current time 0 and state vector x0 in the following iterative manner.
6The criterion functions (la) and (2a) for the consumer and firm satisfy Strotz's (1956, p. 174) consistency condition for any given set of conditioning variables. Consequently, if the government actually implements its optimal time-0 policy path gg over times t?O, the corresponding time-0 competitive equilibrium (c~,f~,p~) will also be implemented over times t?O, and the economy will exhibit consistency. The only way that inconsistency can arise in the present framework is for the government to veer from its optimal time-0 policy path gg.
First, solve (1) for ct as a function of (fE,gz,pi, x0) to obtain the time-0 consumer choice function, denoted by Second, solve (2) for fg as a function of (cz,gE,p&x") to obtain the time-0 firm choice function, denoted by Third, jointly solve (5), (6) and the market equilibrium conditions (3) to obtain the time-0 competitive equilibrium values for (&f~,p~) as functions of (gi, x0), denoted by c; = h'd(g;, x0);
Fourth, substitute (7) into the government's problem (4), thus eliminating the variables cg, f&p:, and solve for go, as a function solely of the current time 0 and state vector x0 to obtain the optimal time-0 policy path for government, denoted by
Finally, substitute (8a) into (7) to obtain (c& fE,&) as functions solely of the current time 0 and state vector x0, the optimal time-0 choice paths for consumer,firm, and price, denoted by c;* = {CO@, x0) ) t 2 0);
The optimal time-0 competitive equilibrium path (cg', fr,gr,p$) will henceforth be denoted by eg*.
Mode1 (1) through (4) is essentially static in that it generates the optimal path ez* at the single point in time z = 0. The verification of consistency for this economy requires the comparison of optima1 paths calculated at successive current times 720 as real time z proceeds. It thus remains to specify how the consumer, the firm, and the government recalculate their optimal choice paths at successive current times r 2 0.
Suppose that r>O is the new current time, and that values {c*(t), f*(t),s*(t), P*(t) 10 i t <T>
for consumer, firm, and government choices and for prices have somehow been realized over times 05 t <r. The new current state vector x*(r) is thus determined by
0 where the vectors i*(t) are recursively generated from the state equations
(11'4
The optimization problem for the consumer at the new current time r takes the form Similarly, the updated optimization problem (2) for the firm at the new current time z takes the form subject to 
Finally, the updated optimization problem (4) for the government at the new current time z takes the form In principle, the time-r optimization problems (12), (14), and (16) can be jointly solved to obtain competitive equilibrium choice and price paths c:, f:, g:, pi as functions solely of the new current time 7 and state vector X*(T) in the same iterative manner previously described for the joint solution of (1) through (4) at time 0 with state vector x0. Let this optimal time-z competitioe 
'(t), x'(t)), t 2 5 i-'(t) = S,(cr(t), f'(t),s'(t), p'(t), x'(t)
(174
It remains to explain where the realized values (9) comes from. At each successive current time ~20 it is assumed that the time-r components, CTT> x*(4 f'(T x*(4), gr(? x*(T)), pyz, x*(T)), (18) of the optimal time-z path e:* are actually realized. A new optimal end-path is then generated based on the new current time and the new current state vector resulting from these realized values, in the manner described above. This type of updating has been referred to in the control literature as 'openloop feedback control' [see Saridis (1977) ].
Necessary and sufficient conditions for consistency
An economy from the general class of dynamic Walrasian economies described in section 2 will be said to exhibit consistency if and only if, for every r>O, the optimal competitive equilibrium path e:' starting at time t with current state vector x*(z) coincides with the [z, GO) continuation ey* of the optimal competitive equilibrium path er starting at time 0 with state vector x0. Thus, consistency holds if and only if, for every z ~0, and for all t22,' r et, x* (4) f'(4 x*(4)
P'k x*(4)
'The four papers initially cited in the introduction focus on the weaker requirement of dynamic pokey consistency,
g'(t, x*(r)) =g"(t, x0), t 2 T > 0, and derive examples of economies
where it fails to hold. As illustrated by these examples, consistency normally prevails for one of the components in (19) if and only if it prevails for all of them. Thus, to avoid discussion of degenerate special cases, attention is focused in the present paper on the stronger consistency requirement (19).
The present section establishes general necessary and sufficient conditions for consistency.8
Proofs are given in the appendix. The derivation of necessary and sufficient conditions for consistency proceeds by comparing the structure of the time-0 government optimization problem (4) to the structure of the time-z government optimization problem (16) for any arbitrary time z > 0. Certain preliminaries are needed for this comparison.
First, the following notational conventions will be used. Define the virtual time-0 state Path ~"0 to be the path of state vectors x'(t), t 20, that would prevail if the optimal time-0 path eg were actually carried out. Thus, .x: is the solution to the state equations iott = Uc"(4 x0), f0(4 xO),gO(t, x0), pO(t, x0), x0(t)), t 20; (204 x0(O) =x0.
(20'4
Also, for each s and t satisfying Oss<~, let the [Is, z) segments of the optimal time-0 path er be abbreviated by
Thus, for example, co,' = (cz:,, c,"'). Second, a simple examination of the nested structure of the time-0 consumer optimization problem (1) reveals that its solution, the time-0 consumer choice function h', depicted in (5), is weakly time separable in the following sense:9 for every t 20, the time-t component function of h',, denoted by Hi, depends at most on time-s variables for current and future times s 2 t. Formally, 'These necessary and sufficient conditions are derived under the following maintained existence and uniqueness assumptions:
(1) The time-r consumer and firm choice functions (13) and (15) exist and are unique for every current time ~20; (2) the state equations (12~) have a unique solution X, for any feasible set of conditioning variables {~~,f,,g,,p,,x(r)}, r?O; and (3) the optimal time-r path (17) exists and is unique for every current time T 2 0.
'%Zontinuity requirements for the consumer and firm choice paths cg and fg would destroy even weak time separability.
In the present paper no such global restrictions are imposed on the solutions c: and f: to the consumer and lirm time-T optimization problems (12) and (14) (4) is equivalent to the following optimization problem in the sense that the same optimal time-0 path eg* is generated from its solution: Suppose that the economy consistently implements the optimal time-0 path ez* over the time interval [OJ), so that the new current time is z and the new current state is x*(z) =x'(z). The government now faces the time-z optimization problem (16) with x*(T)=x'(z). This problem has exactly the same structure as the first six components (24a)-(24f) of problem (24); that is, problem (16) with x*(z) =x'(z) is nested within problem (24).
Consider the final two constraints (24h) and (24i) in problem (24) which do not appear in problem (16) with x*(z) = x'(z). As of time z, the left-hand-side variables and the starred right-hand-side variables of (24h) and (24i) have actually been implemented; the future time t 2 z variables (cf, f,",gf,p,O) have not yet been realized. Thus, as of time z, constraints (24h) and (24i) can be restated as general constraints
on the yet-to-be-realized variables (c,, fT,gZ,pJ, of the form By definition (19), consistency continues to hold at time z if and only if the solution e:*=(c:*,f:*,g:',p:*) to the time-z optimization problem (16) with X*(T) =x'(z) coincides with the [z, co) continuation ey = (cF*, f~,g~*,p~*) of the optimal time-0 path et*. By construction, the particular values assigned to (c,,fr,g,,p,) by eF* satisfy the constraints (25); thus the particular values assigned to (c,, f,,g,,p,) by et* must also satisfy the constraints (25) in order for consistency to hold at z. In particular, then, the choices made by the consumer, firm, and government at time 0 for implementation over the time interval
[O,z) must not be regretted at time z. Constraints (25) are thus appropriately referred to as time-z ex post optimality constraints. The difficulty is that the time-7 ex post optimality constraints (25) do not explicitly appear in the constraint set for problem (16). Thus, unless these constraints are either trivial or redundant for problem (16), the solution et* to problem (16) will not satisfy them, and inconsistency will prevail. The satisfaction of the time-z ex post optimality constraints (25) by e:' for every t>O is thus a necessary condition for consistency. Conversely, as the following theorem shows, the redundancy of constraints (24h) and (24i) for problem (24) for every r >O is a sufficient condition for consistency. A discussion of this suffkient condition for consistency is provided in section 4, below.
Theorem 3.1. (Basic consistency theorem). A necessary condition for consistency is that the time-z ex post optimality constraints (25) are redundant for problem (16) for every z>O, in the sense that they can be appended to the constraints of (16) as restrictions on (c:, f:,g:,p:) without affecting the solution e:* of (16). A sufficient condition for consistency is that the time-0 constraints (24h) and (24i) are redundant for problem (24) for every T>O, in the sense that they can be deleted from the constraints of (24) without affecting the solution er of (24).

The sufficient condition for consistency: Special cases
The sufficient condition for consistency in Theorem 3.1 holds in two special cases: either (a) the consumer and firm exhibit perfect myopic foresight at time 0, in the sense [Burmeister (1980) ] that the consumer and firm choice vectors co(t) and f O(t) depend at most on the levels and right derivatives of time-t variables, t 20; or (b) the consumer has essentially complete structural information at time 0, in the sense that the consumer's feasible choice sets for current and future times incorporate any constraint faced by government which is affected by the consumer's choice vectors.
The first special case (a) implies that the constraints (24h) and (24i) are trivially redundant for problem (24), since they impose no restriction on the future variables Cc,", fF,g,0,pF]. Formally, the following corollary holds: 
Corollary 4.1. (Consistency with perfect myopic foresight). A sufficient condition for consistency is that the time-0 consumer and firm choice functions h', and hi exhibit perfect myopic foresight, in the sense that their component functions HF and Hi have the general structural form co(t) =Hf(f o(t)>fO+(t)>g"(t),gO,(t),po(t),dO,(t),xo(t)), t 20;
Wa) fo(t)=H;'(co(t),CO,(t),go(t),gO,(t),po(t),~O,(t),xo(t))
for his agent's time-0 choice functions, a special case of (26).
In the present context, restrictions on criterion functions and feasible choice sets which guarantee that the time-0 choice functions for both the consumer and the firm have the perfect myopic representations (26) are extremely stringent."
The consumer and firm optimization problems (1) and (2) must each be equivalently expressible as a sequence of myopic period-byperiod optimization problems. Roughly, this requires maximum future expected returns to be positively correlated with current returns for every successive current time z [see Tesfatsion (1980) ].
The second special case (b) for which consistency holds, i.e essentially complete structural information on the part of the consumer at time 0, implies that the constraints (24h) and (24i) are redundant for problem (24) even if they impose nontrioial restrictions on future variables. Special case (b) requires that the consumer's time-0 feasible choice sets incorporate every constraint facing the government at time 0 which is in any way affected by the consumer's time-0 choice path co. O As shown in the appendix proof of the following corollary, no discrepancy then arises between what the government perceives to be optimal for the consumer and what the consumer perceives to be optimal for himself. The consumer and the government face exactly the same optimization problem at time 0, except for the variables they control. As noted by Fischer (1980, p. 106) PO(Q> x0(% t 2 0, (28) implies (cp,gp,pp, x0(t) Milleron (1972, pp. 434435) ].
go(t) Eg:(cO(t),f O(t), PO(t), x0(O), t 2 0. (29) (ii) Either the time-0 market equilibrium conditions (3) are independent of the consumer's time-0 choice path cz, or the consumer's feasible choice sets incorporate these market equilibrium conditions in the sense that (28) implies o= AdcO(t),f o(d3s"(& pow, PO+(t)> X0(q), t 2 0. (30) (iii) Either the firm's time-0 choice function exhibits perfect myopic foresight in the sense of (26b), and is independent of the consumer's time-0 choice path ci, or the consumer's feasible choice sets incorporate the firm's time-0 choice function in the sense that (28) implies f O(t) = H/-
For the class of dynamic Walrasian economies treated in the present paper, with a benevolent government attempting to maximize the lifetime utility of a single representative consumer, the concepts of first-best optimality and Pareto optimality coincide. It is first shown below that a Pareto optimal time-0 path for such an economy can be supported as an optimal time-0 competitive equilibrium path only if the latter path is consistent. The necessity of consistency in this case is fairly obvious, and has been noted by other authors in other contexts [Fischer (1980, p. 95) and Hillier and Malcomson (1984, p. 1441) ]. More interesting is the failure of the converse statement, also established below; namely, consistent optimal time-0 competitive equilibrium paths need not be Pareto optimal.
Necessity of consistency for the support of Pareto optimal paths
Consider an economy from the class of dynamic Walrasian economies described in section 2 for which the time-0 lifetime utility function of the consumer is independent of prices and states, as in standard Walrasian economies, and depends on the government policy path gg through a (possibly trivial) subsequence of policy variables gZ& where g8=(gIg,g2:). Let this time-0 lifetime utility function be denoted by uo(co, 1 _fWk') = 7 u,(cO(t)) 1 f"W>slo@N dt. 
Thus, a time-0 feasible path is Pareto optimal if and only if it is also firstbest optimal, in the sense that it maximizes the time-0 lifetime utility of the consumer subject only to technological feasibility constraints. Suppose a Pareto optimal time-0 path ug" =(c~#,f~#,gl~#) can be supported at time 0 as an optimal competitive equilibrium path; i.e. suppose there exists a price path pg" and a government policy path g2:# such that O# -e0 -cc:", f:w~#,gqY?P:#)
satisfies the time-0 government optimization problem (4). Then ez# must be consistent;
for inconsistency means that government will veer away from gg# =(gZz#,g2:#) at some later time r>O because some other feasible government p_olicy path gy results in a time-r competitive equilibrium path e: =(c:^, f:-,g: ,pf) which yields greater utility U, (c:If:,gl:) to the consumer over times t 27. It follows that a:-= (c:,:, c:^, g,': 9 ff>SG," xc-)
is a feasible time-0 path which yields greater time-0 lifetime utility U,, to the consumer than a:#, a contradiction of the assumed Pareto optimality of ug".
Consistency does not imply Pareto optimality
Now consider the following proposition. Suppose an economy satisfying (32) exhibits consistency, i.e. suppose the [7, co) continuation eF* of the solution eg* = (cr, f~*,g~*,P~) to the time-0 government optimization problem (4) coincides with the solution e: to the time-z government optimization problem (16) for every 7 >O. Does it necessarily follow that the time-0 path a:* = (cr, fg*,glr)
is Pareto optimal? The answer is no. As shown in Tesfatsion (1984a, appendices I.1 and 11.3), Fischer's (1980) two-period economy consisting of a consumer and a benevolent government has a consistent optimal time-0 competitive equilibrium solution in the special case when two particular exogenous parameters, c( and a, are set equal to zero; for then the consumer exhibits perfect myopic foresight. The first-and second-period consumption levels (c"(l), c"(2)) and the government spending level g"(2) for this consistent solution satisfy The following theorem summarizes these observations on the supportability of Pareto optimal paths for the class of economies described in section 2. '%Jsing Bellman's Principle of Optimality (backwards optimization), Fischer (1980, sections 5 and 7) establishes the existence of a consistent path yielding lower time-0 lifetime utility U, than the Pareto optimal solution (command optimum) for his economy. However, Fischer's backwards optimization procedure forces government to ignore constraints (24h) and (24i) when selecting its time-0 policy path gg. Hence, Fischer's consistent path is not a solution for his economy in the sense of satisfying the time-0 government optimization problem (4). In contrast, the present section establishes that consistent solutions e, " for (4) need not be Pareto optimal.
For the class of economies described in section 2, Fischer's requirement that government rely solely on nondistortionary policy instruments when selecting its time-0 policy path gg translates into the requirement that the time-t feasible choice set Ff(c'(t), f'(t),p'(t), x'(t) Also, as shown in Turnovsky and Brock (1980, pp. 189-190, (5) and (16) 
Concluding remarks on special cases (a) and (b)
The special cases (a) and (b) shown in section 4 to be sufficient for consistency are stringent. Since consistency is a necessary condition for the supportability of first-best optima, finding weaker sufficient conditions for consistency would be desirable.
Unfortunately, no such conditions have been found to date. Indeed, in a companion paper [Tesfatsion (1984b) ] it is shown that, for a subclass of the presently considered class of dynamic Walrasian economies, consistency holds if and only if special case (a) or (b) holds. In particular, a first-best optimum is achieved only if special case (a) or (b) holds.
A brief outline of these results will now be given. In period two the firm produces additional good using hired labor and capital carry-over. The produced good is divided into an amount paid to government in the form of (real) lump-sum taxes and an amount supplied to the consumer in the form of consumption good. All profits are distributed back to the consumer. The wage rate and consumption good prices are determined competitively via market clearing conditions. However, markets are incomplete since the consumer cannot borrow or lend. The consumer in period one simply buys consumption good out of profit income. Excess profit income is carried over as savings for old age at a zero real rate of return, irrespective of the marginal productivity of capital in production. The discount factor 8 used by the firm to calculate present-value profits is an exogenously determined timepreference parameter.
It does not necessarily equal one, the discount factor which would be obtained using the zero rate of return on consumer savings. In complete-market Walrasian economies, the firm sector is often modelled as an extension of the consumer (shareholder) sector with entirely harmonious objectives. In the presently considered model, the firm takes this form if and only if 0 equals one.
The following results are established in Tesfatsion (1984b) for this class of economies.
An economy exhibits consistency if and only if either (a) government policy eliminates all dynamic behavior (capital carry-over as well as consumer savings), so that both the consumer and the firm exhibit perfect myopic foresight locally around the solution path; or (b) the firm's discount factor b, equals one (the firm is simply an extension of the consumer), so that the consumer has essentially complete structural information.
(Recall that consumer choice variables do not appear in the government's budget constraint.)
In particular, for each feasib!e configuration of taste and technology parameters, the corresponding economy achieves its unique first-best optimum only either special case (a) or (b) holds. 
(A.21
Proo$ Let s' > 0 be given. For any t 2 0, define mt(x(t)) = a44 x(t)), f'(t, x(t)),g'(t, x(t)), Pf(4 x(t)), x(t)); for every T 2 0; i.e. Definition (19) for consistency is satisfied.
Q.E.D.
A.3 Proof of Corollary 4.1
The perfect myopic foresight representations (26) imply that the constraints (24h) and (24i) place no restrictions on (c,", fF,&,pf) for any r>O. Thus, constraints (24h) and (24i) are redundant for problem (24) since cz:,, ft:,,g$, and p$j', then satisfy these constraints by construction for every ~20. Q.E.D.
fz,gg,pg conditional on (A.13) and (A.14). Thus, constraint (4e) in (4) is redundant, and the solution for (4) is unchanged when (4d) is replaced by (A.1 1). The desired conclusion now follows immediately from Lemma A.3. The proof for the remaining cases is similar. The two-stage maximization argument still goes through, despite the presence of additional constraints, because these additional constraints by assumption are independent of c:.
